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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the growth of new alternative media has brought
greater editorial choice and diversity to political coverage in
many advanced democracies. But their coverage of mainstream
media and portrayal of professional journalism has been subject
to little academic attention. This study examined the role
alternative political media play in advancing public debate about
the value and editorial standards of a national media system.
Drawing on a longitudinal content analysis of UK alternative
media between 2015 and 2018 (N = 3452), we found that
mainstream media was often crticised—particularly in left-wing
sites—and that disapproval of professional journalism intensified
over time, most strikingly during the 2017 general election
campaign. We also discovered that BBC news was often singled
out for its political reporting, with criticism directed at its
perceived bias and lack of impartiality. Overall, we argue it is the
dominant characteristics of mainstream media in national media
systems that help shape the editorial agenda of alternative media
and the nature of criticism directed at professional journalism. We
conclude that more comparative research is needed about how
alternative media represent professional journalism, and whether









As the media have diversified over recent years, there has been a growth of new alterna-
tive online and social media platforms challenging the long-held hegemony of traditional
mainstream media. With this greater choice and market competition, there is evidence of
rising public disaffection with mainstreammedia in many advanced Western democracies
(Steppat, Herrero, and Esser 2020; Strömbäck et al. 2020). In the US, for example, confi-
dence in the news fell dramatically from over two thirds of people in 1968 to just
under a third of people in 2016 (Jones 2018). Even over the last five years, a study of
27 countries found that trust in newspapers, magazines, radio and television, online
and other platforms broadly fell by a third (Ipsos Mori 2019).
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Of course, there are major differences in levels of media trust across countries and
between media systems (Strömbäck et al. 2020). In the US, for instance, trust in media
appears to be ideologically driven. Republicans have long been more sceptical of the
mainstream media than Democrats (Brenan 2020). In a comparative study of European
countries, it was the UK—above Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and
Sweden—that recorded the highest level of public mistrust in journalism (Mitchell et al.
2018). This mistrust may have informed how the UK public interpreted traditional news
media practices and the political balance of coverage. For instance, fewer than half of
people surveyed in the UK—48%—thought the media were “getting the facts right”,
with just over half believing journalists investigated the actions of the government, while
37% thought there was generally politically neutral news coverage (Mitchell et al. 2018).
Needless to say, these survey responses paint a broad picture about the public’s
relationship with mainstream media. In doing so, they do not entirely capture the
complex ways people understand news and journalism cross-nationally, and between
media platforms. But while acknowledging the conceptual and empirical challenges of
measuring engagement with, knowledge about, and attitudes towards mainstream jour-
nalism, Strömbäck et al’s (2020, 151) review of the scholarly literature about media trust
emphatically concluded: “it is abundantly clear that many people do not trust traditional
news media”. They connected this with the rise of “so-called non-mainstream and partisan
media that compete with traditional news media. Such non-mainstream media in many
cases even actively engage in attempts to undermine trust in traditional news media”
(Strömbäck et al. 2020, 151).
Our interest in this study is understanding more specifically if such non-mainstream
media and partisan media have, over time, undermined mainstream media. And, if so,
how have alternative media from both a left-wing and right-wing perspective attempted
to undermine public perceptions of and legitimacy towards traditional news practices? We
draw on the largest content analysis study to date of right-wing and left-wing alternative
media in the UK (N = 3452), which have grown in size and influence since 2015. In particu-
lar, during the 2017 election campaign in the UK, alternative media were viewed as being
as influential as many legacy news organisations (Cushion 2021a; McDowell-Naylor 2019).
Our longitudinal analysis of alternative media between 2015 and 2018 compared content
between right-wing and left-wing sites and assessed the extent of coverage about main-
stream media. This included examining the nature of any critiques of mainstream journal-
ism in order to assess whether right-wing or left-wing sites have attempted to undermine
trust in traditional news media, and, if so, to explore why they have focused on particular
news outlets. We chose the UK as a case study because it ranks as one of the least trusted
media environments in the Western world. It also has a hybrid national media system,
with an influential right-wing partisan press and broadcast media ecology that is
legally required to be impartial (Cushion 2015). This includes a number of public
service broadcasters that attract large audiences, especially the BBC, which has licence
conditions requiring them to be accurate in coverage of politics and public affairs. In com-
parison with many other countries, the UK’s media system has a strong public service
broadcasting presence, as well as highly partisan newspapers that continue to help set
the political agenda in a digital environment. This creates an environment where the
impartiality of broadcasters is often debated in the press and among the political
classes (Cushion et al. 2018).
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Overall, this study explores the role new alternative media play in shaping public
debate about the value and editorial standards of national media systems. Above all,
we found that the agenda of alternative media—especially from new alternative left-
wing sites—routinely attacked mainstream media, with the BBC singled out for the
most hostile criticism mainly directed at its perceived bias and lack of impartiality. By
way of conclusion, we consider the wider implications about the impact of alternative
media in media systems, in particular the public’s trust in and perception of mainstream
media and professional journalism.
Interpreting Alternative Media and Hyperpartisan News
There is a long-standing body of scholarship examining alternative media from a variety
of perspectives (Atton 2002; Downing 2001). This literature has grown stronger in the
digital age as academics focus their attention on how online and social media platforms
open up new ways of creating alternative media (Fuchs 2010; Forde 2011). In doing so,
debates about how alternative media should be theorised and empirically interpreted
have intensified in the context of a fast-changing media ecology. What counts as being
“alternative” media is the subject of fierce debate and embraces discussions about con-
trasting ways of producing content that is considered to be distinctive from mainstream
media, such as their ownership structures or editorial agenda. In doing so, scholars have
conceptualised alternative media as a relational concept; a category that is fluid and con-
ditional on the practise of mainstream media (Curran and Couldry 2003).
Of course, defining what constitutes “mainstream media” is itself contested and open to
debate. In contemporary popular discourse, mainstream media have become broadly
known by the acronym “MSM”. As audience studies have shown, the lines between what
the public view as “alternative media” or “mainstream media” are often blurred and inter-
changeable (Rauch 2019). In our study, the definition of alternative media is sites that con-
sider themsleves either in opposition to the mainstream media or as anti-establishment. An
alternative right-wing site,Westmonster, for example, considers itself “Pro-Brexit, pro-Farage,
pro-Trump. Anti-establishment, anti-open borders, anti-corporatism” (cited in Ponsford
2017). Meanwhile, Evolve Politics claimed the rise of new left-wing alternative media in
the UK—including itself—was a direct result of mainstream media. Its website argues “a
failure of the mainstream media to cater for their audience has resulted in a massive rise
in popularity for new left media outlets such as The Canary, Novara Media, The Skwawkbox,
and, of course, ourselves, Evolve Politics”. In short, our sample was determined by how alterna-
tive media distinguished themselves as editorially distinctive from UK mainstream media.
This distinction is important to acknowledge because of the hybrid format of new
online sites and social media platforms that may be broadly understood as alternative
media. Digital native media, such as the Huffington Post, have been identified as alterna-
tive media by audiences (Rauch 2014), but their many sites across the world would not
necessarily describe themselves as being in opposition to mainstream media in the
same way as more partisan alternative media sites. In appreciating just how much
media ecologies have digitally evolved and diversified over recent years, Holt, Figenschou,
and Frischlich (2020, 860) developed a new set of dimensions that help conceptualise
what is meant by alternative media. In their words:
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Alternative news media position themselves as correctives of the mainstream news media, as
expressed in editorial agendas or statements and/or are perceived as such by their audiences
or third-parties. This counter-hegemonic alternativeness can emerge on the macro-level of
societal function, the meso-level of organisations and/or the micro-level of news content
and producers.
This represents a more inclusive definition of alternative media when compared to pre-
vious definitions. It recognises the fluidity of contemporary media styles formats and
acknowledges the changing dynamics of new alternative platforms and boundaries
that represent something distinctive from the “mainstream”.
But a more inclusive conceptualisation of alternative media has been resisted because
of the particular characteristics of new left-wing and right-wing alternative media—
including sites such as The Canary and Breitbart—that champion a highly partisan
agenda and vehemently oppose mainstream media (Rae 2020). Their rise has been con-
nected with the more populist political environment of recent years (Fenton 2018), which,
in turn, has created a new media environment that privileges a hyperpartisan reporting
style and form. According to Rae (2020), hyperpartisan news represents
a personalisation (bias towards a political leader); badmanners, emotionalisation and simplifi-
cation (transgressive style); polarisation (shuns objectivity and facts to be overtly partisan),
intensification (the elevation of partisan journalism to a ‘hyper’ extreme) and anti-establish-
ment (openly hostile towards mainstreammedia and political parties while appealing directly
to the ‘people’ as content consumers and distributors through social media).
Rae (2020) called for more research and greater empirical clarity about the news prac-
tices and content of new alternative media in order to understand the impact they have
on the wider political and media environment.
This article develops a longitudinal study about both right-wing and left-wing alterna-
tive media in the UK and assesses their hyperpartisan characteristics in respect of the
degree of their hostility towards mainstream media. In doing so, we consider their portrayal
of media systems more broadly, and how they might inform public debate about contem-
porary journalism. Before we introduce our study, we explore the few limited studies that
have empirically examined how alternative or partisan media critique mainstream media,
and explain how we build on and develop new lines of conceptual and empirical inquiry.
Towards Greater Understanding of How (Right-wing and Left-wing)
Alternative Media Critique Mainstream Media
To date, much of the empirical focus about how alternative media report mainstream
media has been qualitative in scope and centred on how new alt-right media portray pro-
fessional journalism (Figenschou and Ihlebæk 2019; Holt 2019; Roberts and Wahl-Jorgen-
sen 2020). Based on interviews with editors of right-wing alternative media in Sweden
about their attitudes towards mainstream media, Holt (2019), for example, identified a
high level of suspicion towards the values and judgements of professional journalists.
This was not a result of structural constraints in journalism—he argued—but a belief
they deliberately skew coverage in order to promote a particular view of society. From
this top-down perspective, a clear editorial motivation to produce alternative media is
to correct the ideological imbalance of traditional news reporting.
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Figenschou and Ihlebæk’s (2019) study of far-right alternative online media developed a
comprehensive content-based analysis of how mainstream media were critiqued. Drawing
on a sample of 600 articles, five editorial practices of far-right media were identified. First,
alternative media sites selected specific stories and used them to highlight a broader
pattern of bias. Second, they sought to analyse stories in more detail and depth than main-
stream media, with experts used as sources to challenge professional journalists. Third,
alternative media sites sought to portray themselves as victims, referencing how they
were badly treated by mainstream media journalists. Fourth, ordinary people were used to
represent “common sense”, in contrast to elites. Fifth, alternative media articles often
reviewed the evidence informingmainstreamcoverage—by accessing, for instance, full tran-
scripts of interviews—and then using it to unmask their selective ideological biases. Overall,
they argued that “to capture the complexities of far-right media criticism (as well as other
forms of contemporary interest-based, non-elite critique), it is useful to identify the multiple
communications strategies deployed to gain authority as a media critic” (Figenschou and
Ihlebæk 2019, 1236).
Roberts and Wahl-Jorgensen (2020) applied Figenschou and Ihlebæk’s (2019) analytical
framework to how the US alternative right-wing media site, Breitbart, conveyed journal-
istic authority and legitimacy in their attacks on mainstream media. Drawing on 213
articles in the media section of the site, they identified three main strategies. The first
was to announce right-wing political “victories” for either Breitbart or the US Republican
president, Donald Trump. This was broadly achieved by arguing mainstream media rep-
resented corporate or political interests, whereas Breitbart addressed the public’s agenda
and adopted a journalistic watchdog role. To highlight the inadequacies of mainstream
media, Roberts and Wahl-Jorgensen (2020) found stories that prominently undermined
professional news practices, such as drawing attention to corrections about their journal-
ism. They also showcased the site’s victories by reporting political triumphs, such as
Trump appointing a right-wing supreme court judge despite objections from liberal
media. Second, the study found Breitbart laid claim to being a victim of mainstream
media, and the politics and culture it represented. This materialised in stories about tra-
ditional conservative or patriotic values being challenged or undermined. According to
Roberts and Wahl-Jorgensen (2020), this meant Breitbart presented “the site as an author-
itative watchdog documenting wrongdoing against members of the conservative com-
munity”. Third, and finally, the most prominent strategy Breitbart used was the
vilification of professional journalism and mainstream media. This resulted in targeting
specific journalists or outlets, labelling them suppliers of “fake news” (echoing Trump)
and undermining their journalistic authority.
Taken together, the body of scholarship exploring how alternative media have criti-
cised mainstream media has largely focused on far-right sites. But since alternative
media tend to be theorised in relation to the “mainstream”, their editorial strategies
and degree of ideological opposition to traditional media may be distinctive from less
far-right sites or left-wing alternative media. Put simply, there is a need to compare
and contrast the content of left-wing and right-wing sites, and to understand the editorial
character of alternative media sites across the political spectrum. Nygaard (2019), for
example, examined 90 immigration articles in Swedish, Danish and Norwegian right-
wing alternative media sites, and discovered their coverage was moderated by national
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ideological parameters of mainstream political and media debates. The findings, accord-
ing to Nygaard (2019, 1160), were
coherent with differences in immigration policy and public discourses within the mainstream
news press between the Scandinavian countries. The alternative media outlets seem to a
certain extent to adapt to the prevailing political consensus and mainstream media dis-
courses in which they coexist.
In other words, national political and media systems shaped alternative media content.
Our study builds upon this small but growing body of scholarship in four distinctive
ways. Since the focus in this area has been largely qualitative in scope, our study provided:
(1) a systematic, quantitative picture about the degree of alternative media coverage of
mainstream media and the strategies used to undermine traditional journalism. It goes
beyond the empirical focus on alt-right media in order to explore whether (2) either
right-wing or left-wing alternative media sites were more inclined to criticise coverage
of mainstream media and identify any divergent editorial strategies. It also assessed (3)
whether the editorial focus on mainstream media changed over time in different left-
wing and right-wing alternative media sites. More broadly, our study interpreted (4)
the role played by national media systems in policing the boundaries of criticism
towards mainstream media. Given the UK’s hybrid national media system, with a domi-
nant right-wing partisan press but an influential impartial broadcasting ecology, overall
we consider whether this media environment shaped the nature and volume of criticism
towards mainstream media, and the targeting of particular types of journalists and news
outlets.
Method
The study drew on a content analysis of both left-wing and right-wing alternative media
sites between 2015 and 2018. For left-wing sites, this included The Canary, The Skwawk-
box, Evolve Politics, Another Angry Voice and Novara Media, and for right-wing sites, Guido
Fawkes, Breitbart London, Westmonster and The Conservative Woman. Our sample was
chosen on the basis of identifying the most influential alternative online political media
sites in the UK. Our criteria for interpreting “influence” was informed by consulting
studies that examined how widely their online stories were shared across different
social media platforms (McAlister 2017). We excluded media such as the Huffington
Post and Indy 500, which are tied to traditional media ownership structures and have
also excluded sites that are affiliated to a political party, such as Labour List or Conservative
Home. As previously outlined, the criteria for our sample was independently funded
alternative media, although how this is achieved varied between sites (from raising
funds via users of the sites to billionaire supporters, such as Aaron Banks and his
financial backing for Westmonster). The broad aim of this study was to identify how
both left-wing and right-wing alternative media reported mainstream media over time.
Since some of the left-wing sites, which have gained most prominence in the UK, were
launched post 2015, our study assessed whether their editorial focus and nature of cover-
age had changed.
Overall, the study examined 3452 items, and quantified the degree and nature of cri-
tique towards mainstream media. We examined three-week sample periods each year
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between 2015 and 2018 (6–25 October 2015; 9–29 October 2016; 30 April–7 June 2017;
and 8–28 October 2018.). We included analysing the general election campaign over a
six week period (rather than three weeks) because it reflected an important period in
the UK’s democracy, and represented a moment in time when alternative left-wing
media were considered to be especially influential (Waterson 2017).
The content analysis began by assessing the degree to which mainstream media was
part of routine coverage over four years (N = 3452). This provided us with a subsample of
665 articles, which we examined in more depth and detail. The unit of analysis was every
mention of a news media organisation (including different references to outlets within an
article). At times, references to mainstream media were brief or in passing, but we only
coded them when they were explicitly mentioned. Similar references to mainstream
media within a sentence were included as a single mention. Where two or more refer-
ences to mainstream media were identical or extremely similar, we collated them
together, so they made up a single referential unit of analysis.
The content analysis began by assessing how many of the 3452 articles in the original
sample contained instances of media critique, which we defined as evaluative statements
about the media. This created a subsample, which after validation checks, yielded 665
articles which form the focus of the analysis in this study. The unit of observation was
what we defined as a “mention”. These were sentence levels instances of media critique
that conformed to our coding variables. For example, a phrase which reads “The Sun is a
biased against Labour”. Repeated mentions or mentions that were semantically identical
were collated into a unit of analysis, which we defined as a “reference”. References often
contained one mention, but in some cases contained up to five or six if a particular phrase
was repeated. We used references as the unit of analysis to avoid artificially inflating our
coding results.
The analysis focuses on the operationalisation of four key variables, which are as
follows:
(1) The media entity. This identified whether the reference was to: an individual journalist
and/or their article; individual editor; a publication/outlet, including any program-
ming or features; leadership and/or ownership; a general reference to the mainstream
media; or a general reference to alternative media.
(2) The organisation. This identified whether the reference was to a particular outlet, such
as BBC, The Guardian, Daily Mail and so on.
(3) Sentiment. This identified whether the reference was offering: overt criticism (e.g.,
“The BBC is biased”); implied criticism (e.g., “a BBC guest is revealed as a Labour acti-
vist”); overt praise (e.g., “great reporting from the BBC”); implied praise (“reporting
from ITV has revealed the truth about this issue”).
(4) Finally, criticism or praise type. This identified whether the reference was about:
factual accuracy (e.g., “The BBC’s facts are all wrong”); impartiality or bias (e.g., “The
BBC is helping the Conservatives”); Quality (e.g., “The BBC’s reporting is terrible”); cov-
erage (e.g., “the BBC is not covering this important issue”); culture and regulations
(e.g., “The BBC staff are paid too much”), or other.
The intercoder reliability test examined approximately 10% of the sample and was
carried out by two coders. Overall, we found all variables had a high degree of agreement
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and, according to Cohen’s Kappa (CK), a high statistical degree of reliability. For variable 1,
there was no disagreements. For variable 2, the score was 0.94 (CK). For variable 3, the
score was 0.72 (CK). For variable 4, the score was 0.87 (CK).
The study had three main research questions:
What was the extent and nature of alternative media criticism towards mainstream media?
Were there any differences between how left-wing and right-wing alternative media criticised
mainstream media?
Did coverage of mainstreammedia in alternative media change in volume between 2015 and
2018, and if so how did the nature of content change?
The (changing) editorial focus of alternative media critiques of mainstream
media between 2015 and 2018
Of the 3452 alternative media items we examined over a four-year period, 665—19.3%—
included content that substantively referred to mainstreammedia. In 2015, 16.6% of items
included an item that critiqued mainstream media—either positively or negatively—
rising to 19.0% in 2016 and 22.7% in 2017, before falling to 12.3% in 2018. When we
break down the differences in how often left-wing and right-wing sites featured a critique
of mainstream media, Table 1 shows that in 2015 they were broadly the same. Since then
left-wing sites have granted far more editorial emphasis on critiquing professional
journalism.
So, while in 2015, all alternative media sites roughly critiqued mainstream journalism to
the same proportion, on left-wing sites over time this rose to approximately 3–4 times
more between 2016 and 2017. This focus fell to 21.9% of all articles in 2018, but it still
represented a higher proportion of coverage than in 2015. For right-wing sites, coverage
of mainstream media reduced from 2015 to 2018. But, on closer inspection, left-wing and
right-wing alternative media sites were not uniform in their editorial focus on professional
journalism. We found striking differences in the degree of attention paid towards main-
stream media between sites and over time (see Tables 2 and 3).
Overall, coverage of mainstream media was far higher on left-wing rather than right-
wing alternative media sites. Another Angry Voice stood out as the most editorially
focused about traditional journalism, with nearly half of its articles (45.6%) featuring a cri-
tique. Typical headlines of these articles included: “Are the Daily Mail deliberately ridicul-
ing their own readers?” (20/10/16), “Don’t let the mainstream media con you into
believing the Tories aren’t ideological extremists” (28/5/17) and “Why do the mainstream
press let the Tories get away with systematically abusing disabled people?” (29/5/17).
The proportion of articles with a mainstream media critique was roughly a third for The
Canary, Skwakwbox and Evolve Politics, compared to roughly two in 10 articles in Novara
Media. In right-wing alternative media sites, The Conservative Woman had, by far, the most
intensive editorial focus on critiquing mainstream media, with 28.9% of all its articles con-
taining some sort of evaluation, including stories entitled: “The BBC stacks the deck
against grammar schools—no surprise there” (27/5/17) and “The Telegraph Wimmin’s
section—a fact-free zone” (12/10/16). Other right-wing sites had between 3 and 5
times proportionally fewer items about mainstream media, featuring in a total of 8.3%
of articles in Breitbart, 8.1% in Guido Fawkes and 5.4% in Westmonster.
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Table 1. Percentage of alternative media items that include a critique of mainstream media (N in brackets).
2015 2016 2017 2018
TotalYes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Left wing sites 18.6% (13) 81.4% (57) 36.8% (63) 63.2% (108) 38.1% (313) 61.9% (508) 21.9% (57) 78.1% (203) 100.0% (1322)










When the changing focus of mainstream media critique between 2015 and 2018 was
examined, the differences between right-wing and left-wing sites were brought into
sharper focus (see Table 3). All sites produced far more articles in 2018 compared to
when they first launched. In this respect, the volume of articles featuring some form of
mainstream critique increased over time. However, in proportional terms, on some sites
(Another Angry Voice, Novara Media and Breitbart) coverage of professional journalism
reduced when their agenda in 2015 is compared with 2018.
Perhaps the most striking level of coverage towards mainstream media was evident
during the 2017 election campaign, which we examined over six weeks (not three
weeks). In this critical period of time, which made up well over half of the total sample
of items, intensive scrutiny of political coverage was on full display, with 38.0% of items
in left-wing sites featuring a critique of mainstream media (see Table 3). Another Angry
Voice, for example, had 46.2% of its articles about mainstream media, while The Canary
at 38.5%, The Skwawkbox at 36.2% and Evolve Politics at 32.1%, also made professional jour-
nalism a prominent part of coverage. For alternative right-wing sites, The Conservative
Woman stood out since it increased its editorial critique of mainstream media, with
almost a third—32.7%—of items dedicated to this topic over the campaign period.
When we examined the nature of mainstream media critique references, we found the
vast majority of them—92.4% in total—were critical in tone, while the remaining 7.6% of
the references praised an outlet, specific journalist or the mainstream media more gener-
ally (see Table 4). In order to assess the tone of media critiques, we also examined whether
either criticism or praise was overt or implied (excluding any that were unclear).
There was a clear majority of critiques about mainstream media—over eight in 10 in
total—that were overtly critical in tone. This overt hostility to mainstream media was in
almost equal measure for both alternative right-wing and left-wing sites, making up
81.5% of all media critiques. On the left, Another Angry Voice, Novara Media and The
Canary were the most critical in tone towards mainstream media, along with the alterna-
tive right-wing site, The Conservative Woman. Typical examples of overt criticism included
statements such as, “The vicious anti-Corbyn bias of the mainstream media” (Another
Angry Voice, 27/05/2017) and “propaganda minions at The S*n” (Another Angry Voice,
24/05/2017), or claiming that the BBC has a “demonstrable bias against Jeremy
Corbyn” (The Canary, 18/10/2016) or regularly using the term “mainstream media bias”
(Canary, 07/05/2020).
Table 2. Percentage of alternative media items that include a critique of
mainstream media (N in brackets).
Yes No Total
Left wing sites
The Canary 33.3% 66.7% 100% (726)
Skwawkbox 32.2% 67.8% 100% (329)
Evolve Politics 29.4% 70.6% 100% (102)
Another Angry Voice 45.6% 54.4% 100% (136)
Novara Media 20.7% 79.3% 100% (29)
Right wing sites
Guido Fawkes 8.1% 91.9% 100% (849)
Breitbart UK 8.3% 91.7% 100% (626)
Westmonster 5.4% 94.6% 100% (389)
The Conservative Woman 28.9% 71.1% 100% (266)
Total 100% 100% 100% (3452)
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Table 3. Percentage of alternative media items that include a critique of mainstream media between 2015 and 2018 (N in brackets).
2015 2016 2017 2018
TotalYes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Left wing sites





Sk’box – – 41.9% (13) 58.1% (18) 36.2% (76) 63.8% (134) 19.3% (17) 80.7% (71) 100% (329)
Evolve Politics – 100.0% (1) 40.9% (9) 61.9% (13) 32.1% (18) 67.8% (38) 13.0% (3) 87.0% (20) 100% (102)
AAV 50.0% (2) 50.0% (2) 50.0% (3) 50.0% (3) 46.2% (55) 53.8% (64) 28.6% (2) 71.4% (5) 100% (136)
Novara Media 66.7% (2) 33.3% (1) 14.3% (1) 85.7% (6) 13.3% (2) 86.7% (13) 25.0% (1) 75.0% (3) 100% (29)
Total 18.6% (13) 81.4% (57) 36.8% (63) 63.2% (108) 38.1% (313) 61.9 (508) 21.9% (57) 78.1% (203) 100.0 (1322)
Right wing sites





Breitbart UK 17.0% (23) 83.0% (112) 1.5% (2) 98.5% (133) 7.6% (20) 92.4% (243) 7.5% (7) 92.5% (86) 100% (626)
West’er – – – – 7.4% (18) 92.6% (224) 2.0% (3) 98.0% (144) 100% (389)
CW 15.2% (5) 84.8% (28) 35.4% (17) 64.6% (31) 32.7% (36) 67.3% (74) 25.3% (19) 74.7% (56) 100% (266)
TOT 16.1% (48) 83.9% (250) 9.4% (30) 90.6% (289) 10.3% (106) 89.7% (919) 7.2% (35) 92.8% (453) 100.0 (2130)
Overall Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0










The Conservative Woman typically included direct accusations that the BBC was biased,
or that individual journalists, such as Jeremy Paxman, have a party-political agenda (The
Conservative Woman, 30/05/2017). Examples of implied criticism included sarcastic com-
ments such as “we’re very lucky to have a proud, free, and independent press” (The
Canary, 13/10/2015), or a pointed reference to a concentration media ownership like
“Considering Rupert Murdoch’s News UK controls a third of our national newspapers”
(The Canary, 10/10/2016). A consistent theme of implied praise was the perception that
journalists were holding politicians to account. For example, a Conservative politician,
Michael Fallon, was under pressure in an interview over a set of statistics, “after
Andrew Marr actually quoted it to him” (Another Angry Voice, 14.05.2017). Overt praise
often focused on the quality of journalism, such as “the interview was painstakingly
fair” (Guido Fawkes, 09/05/2017) or a “standing ovation for #BlackpoolGazette for
world-class #ToryTrolling” (Skwawkbox, 06/06/2017).
We did not identify any meaningful patterns in the changing tone of coverage across
either left-wing or right-wing sites between 2015 and 2018. Overall, when alternative
media sites featured mainstream media in their coverage they were, most of the time,
overtly critical of professional journalism.
The Object of Media Critiques
In order to explore the object of alternative media criticism of mainstream media, we
assessed whether every substantive mention was related to either an individual journalist
or editor, a publication or outlet, a media leader or owner, or if it was a more general refer-
ence to mainstream media or alternative media. As Table 5 shows, above all critiques of
the mainstream media were most prominently directed at specific publications or outlets,
especially right-wing alternative media sites.
Just over six in 10 articles on right-wing sites—61.6%—focused their mainstream cri-
tique about specific publications or outlets compared to 43.6% of items in alternative
left-wing media. It was only Another Angry Voice that contained a high level of references
to mainstream media—45.5% in total—among left-wing sites. Left-wing alternative
media sites, in total, focused on invoking mainstream media in roughly a third of all
articles, such as Another Angry Voice’s “13 questions mainstream media should be
Table 4. Percentage of the type of media critque references by tone (N in brackets).
Overt criticism Implied criticism Overt praise Implied praise Total
Left wing sites
Canary 83.8% (537) 9.8% (63) 2.2% (14) 4.3% (27) 100.0% (641)
Another Angry Voice 89.6% (1380) 5.2% (8) 2.6% (4) 2.6% (4) 100.0% (154)
Skwawkbox 72.3% (167) 13.8% (32) 13.4% (31) 0.4% (1) 100.0% (231)
Evolve Politics 68.4% (26) 21.1% (8) 5.3% (2) 2.6% (1) 100.0% (38)
Novara Media 85.7% (6) – – 14.3% (1) 100.0% (7)
Total 81.6% (874) 10.4% (111) 4.9% (52) 3.2% (34) 100.0% (1071)
Right wing sites
Westmonster 77.8% (14) 16.7% (3) 5.6% (1) – 100.0% (18)
Guido Fawkes 70.2% (59) 16.7% (14) 10.7% (9) 2.4% (2) 100.0% (84)
Breitbart UK 78.7% (85) 21.3% (23) – – 100.0% (108)
The Conservative Woman 89.4% (143) 3.8% (6) 2.5% (4) 4.4% (7) 100.0% (160)
Total 81.4% (301) 12.4% (46) 3.8% (14) 2.4% (9) 100.0% (370)
Overall 81.5% (1175) 10.9% (157) 4.6% (66) 3.0% (43) 100.0% (1441)
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Table 5. Percentage of media critique references about either journalists, editors, specific programmes or media generally (N in brackets).
IJ IEIC P/O L/O GRMSM GRAM Total
Left wing sites
Canary 15.1% (97) 0.5% 2. (3) 47.0% (303) 7.5% (48) 29.3% (189) 0.6% (4) 100.0% (644)
Another Angry Voice 6.5% (10) – 37.0% (57) 9.1% (14) 45.5% (70) 1.9% (3) 100.0% (154)
Skwawkbox 20.7% (48) 0.4% (1) 37.9% (88) 3.4% (8) 35.3% (82) 2.2% (5) 100.0% (232)
Evolve Politics 10.5% (4) – 47.4% (18) – 42.1% (16) – 100.0% (38)
Novara Media – – 42.9% (3) – 42.9% (3) 14.3% (1) 100.0% (7)
Total 14.8% (159) 0.4% (4) 43.6% (469) 6.5% (70) 33.4% (360) 1.2% (13) 100.0% (1075)
Right wing sites
Westmonster 11.1% (2) 16.7% (3) 55.6% (10) 5.6% (1) 11.1% (2) – 100.0% (18)
Guido Fawkes 24.4% (21) 1.2% (1) 67.4% (58) 3.5% (3) 2.3% (2) 1.2% (1) 100.0% (86)
Breitbart UK 26.6% (29) 0.9% (1) 58.7% (64) 0.9% (1) 12.8% (14) – 100.0% (109)
The Conservative Woman 29.3% (49) 2.4% (4) 61.1% (102) 0.6% (1) 6.6% (11) – 100.0% (167)
Total 26.6% (101) 2.4% (9) 61.6% (234) 1.6% (6) 7.6% (29) 0.3% (1) 100.0% (380)
Total 17.9% (260) 0.9% (13) 48.3% (703) 5.2% (76) 26.7% (389) 1.0% (14) 100.0% (1455)
NB: IJ – Individual Journalist, IEIC – Individual Editor in Chief, P/O – Publication/Outlet, L/O – Leader/Ownership, GRMSM – General reference to MSM, GRAM – General reference to Alt Media.
Table 6. Percentage of media critiques about specific mainstream media outlets (N in brackets).
BBC OB RWNM LWNM RAM LAM Other Total
Left wing sites
Canary 33.0% (146) 8.6% (38) 35.3% (156) 12.4% (55) 0.5% (2) – 10.2% (45) 100.0% (442)
Another Angry Voice 7.4% (5) 2.9% (2) 76.5% (52) 2.9% (2) / 1.5% (1) 8.8% (6) 100.0% (68)
Skwawkbox 43.0% (55) 5.5% (7) 14.1% (18) 15.6% (20) 4.7% (6) 10.9% (14) 6.3% (8) 100.0% (128)
Evolve Politics 18.2% (4) 13.6% (3) 27.3% (6) 27.3% (6) / / 13.6% (3) 100.0% (22)
Novara Media 33.3% (1) 33.3% (1) 33.3% (1) / / 100.0% (3)
Total 31.8% (211) 7.5% (50) 35.1% (233) 12.7% (84) 1.2% (8) 2.3% (15) 9.4% (62) 100.0 (663)
Right wing sites
Westmonster 43.8% (7) 25.0% (4) 12.5% (2) / / / 18.8% (3) 100.0% (16)
Guido Fawkes 27.7% (26) 5.3% (5) 22.3% (21) 20.2% (19) / 14.9% (14) 9.6% (9) 100.0% (94)
Breitbart UK 37.9% (36) 14.7% (14) 16.8% (16) 18.9% (18) 1.1% (1) 10.5% (10) 100.0% (95)
The Conservative Woman 74.2% (115) 2.6% (4) 9.0% (14) 7.1% (11) 1.9% (3) 0.6% (1) 4.5% (7) 100.0% (155)
Total 51.1% (184) 7.5% (27) 14.7% (53) 13.3% (48) 1.1% (4) 4.2% (15) 8.1% (29) 100.0% (360)
Overall 38.6% (395) 7.5% (77) 28.0% (286) 12.9% (132) 1.2% (12) 2.9% (30) 8.9% (91) 100.0% (1023)










asking about Salman Abedi” (29/5/17) and The Canary’s “A filmmaker has accused the
mainstream media of ‘disgusting’ bullying of Jeremy Corbyn” (3/6/17). In alternative
right-wing media, general criticism towards mainstream media amounted to just 7.6%
of articles. Instead, individual journalists were the objects of critique far more in right-
wing sites, making up 26.6% of all media critique articles compared to 14.8% in alternative
left-wing media.
Between 2015 and 2018, many sites had a consistent focus in their critiques of main-
stream media. But there were some interesting changes over time. The Canary, for
example, became less focused on mainstream media generally and more centred on sin-
gling out individual journalists. To a lesser extent, alternative right-wing sites—Westmon-
ster, Breitbart and The Conservative Woman—also increased their focus on individual
journalists after 2015. To understand more fully which news organisations were subject
to most alternative media attention, we classified the main focus of critiques into the fol-
lowing categories: the BBC, other broadcasters, right wing newspapers and magazines,
left-wing newspapers and magazines, alternative right-wing media, alternative left-
wing media and other media (and excluded any that did not reference a specific
outlet). Table 6 shows, overall, the BBC was the outlet that attracted most attention.
Table 7 reveals that the volume and proportion of coverage overtly or implicitly critical
of the BBC was at its highest during the 2017 general election campaign.
Over the four-year study, other broadcasters did not prominently feature in alternative
media to the same degree as the BBC, with the exception of Westmonster, where they
made up a quarter critiques about mainstream media.
However, for left-wing alternative media it was both right-wing newspapers and maga-
zines, and the BBC, that made up almost equal focus—35.1% and 33.8% respectively—in
their critiques of specific mainstream media outlets. Even within alternative left-wing
media sites, there was some variation in focus. For example, 76.5% of Another Angry
Voice mainstream media critiques focused on right-wing newspapers and magazines,
compared to just 14.1% on The Skwawkbox. Of all the left-wing sites, Skwawkbox was
the most pre-occupied with the BBC, making up 43% of its items when a specific main-
stream media outlet was critiqued.
Just over half (51.1%) of alternative right-wing media sites focused on the BBC in their
critiques of mainstream media. All right-wing sites made the public service broadcaster a
central part of their coverage of mainstream media. By far, The Conservative Woman stood
out as the most vocal critic, with nearly three in four of its items centred on the BBC.
Examples of its coverage included articles headlined: “BBC Election Watch: ‘Impartial’
BBC website loads dice against Tories” (15/5/17) and “David Keighley’s BBC Election
Watch: Past it Paxman left Corbyn in the clear” (30/5/17). Unsurprisingly, alternative
left-wing media sites focused moreattention on right-wing newspapers and magazines
Table 7. Percentage of media critiques expressing either overt or implicit criticism of the BBC (N in
brackets).
Year Right-wing sites Left-wing sites Percentage
2015 92.9% (13) 7.1% (1) 3.8% (14)
2016 52.0% (26) 48.0% (24) 13.6% (50)
2017 40.2% (103) 59.8% (153) 69.4% (256)
2018 65.3% (32) 34.7% (17) 13.3% (49)
Total 47.1 (174) 195 (52.8) 100.0% (369)
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than right-wing alternative media sites. But interestingly, with the exception of Breitbart,
all alternative right-wing media sites were more critical of right-wing newspapers and
magazines than left-wing newspapers and magazines.
Finally, we examined the topics about mainstream media in alternative media sites
(Table 8). We found a broadly similar editorial focus across most alternative media sites
when mainstream media were mentioned.
Above all, a perceived bias or lack of impartiality made up approximately half of all
alternative media articles about mainstream media. An example of a perceived lack of
impartiality included a story headlined: “A BBC editor has spelled out why the broadcas-
ter’s bias is justified, and it’s utterly outrageous” (The Canary, 14/10/2016). Comparing cov-
erage over time, for most sites it was during the 2017 general election campaign when
criticism of mainstream media bias and breaches of impartiality were most apparent.
Indeed, as Table 9 shows, over seven in 10 of these items— 71.0%—occurred during
the 2017 election campaign.
Questioning the quality of mainstream media coverage was the next most reported
topic at 15.9% and 16.1% on left-wing and right-wing sites respectively. An example of
how the quality of media coverage was questioned included an item headlined: “The
media keeps elevating fascists while ignoring minorities. This must stop now” (The
Canary, 18.10.18). Issues related to the factual accuracy of mainstream media featured
in 14.7% and 11.1% of left-wing and right-wing sites respectively. For example, one head-
line about factual accuracy read: “ITV has been scolded over an interview with Nicola Stur-
geon”, in which a journalist was criticised for the presentation of statistics (The Canary,
23.10.2018). Another notable topic was story omissions by mainstream media—what
was not reported, but should have been according to alternative media sites—making
up 12.2% of articles about mainstream media criticism in left-wing media, but just 6.3%
in right-wing media.
The Editorial Agenda of Alternative Media: Why National Media Systems
Matter
We found critiques of mainstream media were published in roughly two in every 10
articles in left-wing alternative media and three in every 20 articles in right-wing alterna-
tive media. The vast majority of critiques about mainstream media—92.4% in total—were
highly critical in tone across right-wing and left-wing sites, with few stories over the four-
year study signalling any support towards or praise about professional journalism. When
the object of criticism was isolated, we discovered nearly two thirds of alternative right-
wing media items focused on specific publications or outlets compared to 43.5% in
alternative left-wing media. Alternative left-wing media invoked criticism of the MSM gen-
erally in roughly a third of articles featuring a media critique. By contrast, in alternative
right-wing media it amounted to under one in ten articles. We found individual journalists
were targets of more attention in right-wing than left-wing sites. For example, The Canary
increased its editorial focus on specific journalists tenfold over time (from 2.9% in 2015 to
21.8% in 2018). All right-wing sites also enhanced their critique of specific journalists, but
to a lesser extent than left-wing media.
Above all, the BBC was the central focus of criticism on left-wing and right-wing
alternative media, reflecting nearly half of all critiques about mainstream media over
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Table 8. Percentage of media critiques by topics in alternative media sites (N in brackets).
FA I/B Q CO C + R Other Total
Left wing sites
Canary 14.6% (94) 52.3% (337) 13.2% (85) 13.0% (84) 0.8% (5) 6.1% (39) 100.0% (644)
Another Angry Voice 5.8% (9) 61.7% (95) 15.6% (24) 9.1% (14) 3.9% (6) 3.9% (6) 100.0% (154)
Skwawkbox 21.1% (49) 37.9% (88) 22.0% (51) 12.5% (29) – 6.5% (15) 100.0% (232)
Evolve Politics 15.8% (6) 36.8% (14) 28.9% (11) 10.5% (4) – 7.9% (3) 100.0% (38)
Novara Media – 71.4% (5) – – 28.6% (2) – 100.0% (7)
Total 14.7% (158) 50.1% (539) 15.9% (171) 12.2% (131) 1.2% (13) 5.9% (63) 100.0% (1075)
Right wing sites
Westmonster 5.6% (1) 61.1% (11) 5.6% (1) – 22.2% (4) 5.6% (1) 100.0% (18)
Guido Fawkes 22.1% (19) 23.3% (20) 34.9% (30) 7.0% (6) – 12.8% (11) 100.0% (86)
Breitbart UK 14.7% (16) 50.5% (55) 8.3% (9) 6.4% (7) 15.6% (17) 4.6% (5) 100.0% (109)
The Conservative Woman 3.6% (6) 59.6% (99) 12.7% (21) 6.6% (11) 12.7% (21) 4.8% (8) 100.0% (166)
Total 11.1% (42) 48.8% (185) 16.1% (61) 6.3% (24) 11.1% (42) 6.6% (25) 100.0% (379)
Overall 13.7% (200) 49.8% (724) 16.0% (232) 10.7% (155) 3.8% (55) 6.1% (88) 100.0% (1454)










four years. This editorial scrutiny of the UK’s main public service broadcaster grew over
time and was particularly prominent during the 2017 general election campaign. The
topic that most exercised both alternative right-wing and left-wing sites was a perceived
media bias or lack of impartiality in broadcast media. This alone made up approximately
half of alternative media articles about mainstream media. Overall, we found UK alterna-
tive media were routintely critical about the mainstreammedia and their coverage of poli-
tics, with BBC news often singled out for not reporting impartially (cf. Cushion 2021a).
How, then, should our findings be interpreted more widely? Our study empirically
revealed how regularly UK alternative media were openly hostile to mainstream media.
Not only that, it highlighted the focal point of this opposition, which, for the most part,
was not about the mainstreammedia generally. For alternative left-wing media, it was tar-
geting right-wing partisan outlets. And for both alternative left-and right-wing sites, it was
critical coverage of BBC journalism, the UK’s main public service broadcaster. At the heart
of this alternative media criticism was a perceived bias in professional journalism and a
lack of impartiality in broadcast media.
In our view, this editorial focus demonstrates the importance of understanding national
media systems when analysing the nature of alternative media criticism towards main-
stream media and professional journalism. After all, alternative media criticism was
often centred on the UK’s right-wing national press system and its national broadcast
ecology, especially the BBC. The UK’s mix of public and private broadcasting, and a
highly partisan and agenda-setting press, represents a distinctive media system when
compared to many other nations (Curran 2010). This hybrid national media system is
reflected in UK alternative media coverage of mainstrem media. By contrast, Rauch’s
(2021) analysis of alternative media in the US found many left-wing audiences favoured
the BBC, as well as the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) in America, in part because of
their perceived impartiality. Their opposition to mainstream media was centred on Amer-
ica’s hypercommercialised media system, which was seen to undermine the quality of
mainstream journalism. In other words, it is the specific characteristics of mainstream
media in national systems that drives the editorial agenda of alternative media and the
nature of criticism directed at professional journalism.
While all UK broadcasters are legally required to be impartial, it is the BBC’s editorial
choices that, by far, face most regulatory and media scrutiny, attracting widespread
public attention. As Barwise and York (2020) suggest in their book, The War Against the
BBC, over recent decades there has been an unprecedented combination of hostile
forces that routinely attack the UK’s main public service broadcaster. Historically, this
was largely driven by commercial media but today it also comes from new online and
social media platforms. Given the influence of BBC news and its public service funding
model, it is understandable why the institution is routinely held to account for its editorial
Table 9. Percentage of media critiques expressing either overt or implicit criticism about impartiality/
bias in alternative media sites (N in brackets).
Year Right-wing sites Left-wing sites Percentage
2015 46.9% (23) 53.1% (26) 6.8% (49)
2016 26.2% (28) 73.8% (79) 15.1% (107)
2017 21.8% (110) 78.2% (395) 71.0% (505)
2018 40.4% (21) 59.6% (31) 7.2% (52)
Total 25.5% (182) 74.5% (531) 100.0% (713)
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choices. There have been legitimate criticisms of the BBC and its interpretation of impar-
tiality in coverage of politics and public affairs (Freedman 2019), as there have been about
UK broadcasting more generally (Cushion and Thomas 2019). Viewed in this light, alterna-
tive media are reflecting some of the concerns about the practices and values of pro-
fessional journalism. Of course, more qualitative close textual research is needed to
evaluate whether their critiques of mainstream media are generally legitimate lines of
inquiry or a product of partisanship (see Cushion 2021b).
What our quantitative study revealed was that alternative media most often focused
on just the BBC’s impartiality, rather than other broadcast media. In our view, this suggests
that alternative media criticism of mainstream media was largely driven by partisan
attacks towards the BBC rather than an editorial interest in raising legitimate concerns
about bias or impartiality in professional journalism. How highly partisan newspapers
and magazines report politics was not subject to the same level of criticism as the BBC.
From both sides of the political spectrum, our study established that if more people are
exposed to alternative media in the UK they are more likely to encounter criticism of main-
stream media, especially directed at BBC journalism and its perceived lack of impartiality.
We cannot assume cause and effect, of course, since audiences could be exposed to
alternative media content without necessarily being influenced by it. But a study of five
nations—Italy, Poland, the US, Switzerland and Denmark—with different levels of frag-
mentation and polarisation in their media environments suggested that alternative
media were having an impact on audience perceptions towards mainstream media
(Steppat, Herrero, and Esser 2020). In comparative surveys in each nation, Steppat,
Herrero, and Esser (2020, 330) found “the higher the level of fragmentation and polaris-
ation, the worse the perceived news performance, especially with regard to journalistic
independence and objectivity”. They further argued that “The use of alternative news
media sources seems to promote people’s image that the news media performs
poorly” (Steppat, Herrero, and Esser 2020, 331). Similarly, from a US perspective, Ladd
(2013) explored the decline of public trust in mainstream media by examining coverage
of alternative media. He discovered alternative media content nurtured mistrust of main-
stream media, most strikingly among Conservative audiences with right-wing views. They
were also more cynical about professional journalism than Liberal audiences with left-
wing perspectives about politics and public affairs.
Based on the information supply of alternative media in the UK, our study reinforced
the case that people exposed to left-wing and right-wing sites weremore likely to encoun-
ter critical coverage of mainstream media, in particular about the BBC. In the case of the
UK, survey research has found public trust in mainstream media has fallen over recent
years, especially among left-wing voters (Newman et al. 2020). While the study discovered
the BBC remained the most trusted news organisation, longitudinal data showed that for
people holding either left-wing or right-wing views, their trust in the UK’s main public
service broadcaster fell by a fifth over a two-year period between 2018 and 2020. Since
alternative media sites tend to be made up of audiences with strong ideological views
(Kalogeropoulos and Newman 2018), this suggests their critical coverage of mainstream
media could be having an impact on audience attitudes towards professional journalism,
in particular BBC news output.
Put more generally, this means an increase in the consumption of alternative media
could lead to a greater mistrust in mainstream media and professional journalism. This,
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in our view, has significant long-term consequences that warrants far more scholarly
attention and research about how people become informed about politics and public
affairs. After all, if more people rely on alternative media, it could influence not only
how much trust they have in professional journalism, but how much faith they invest
in democratic decision-making and society more widely. Our study has revealed the
degree to which alternative media focus on mainstream media and the type of criticism
they routinely receive from both right-wing and left-wing sites. But future research should
address how alternative media audiences engage with the content of different sites
across national media systems, including how they portray mainstream media and pro-
fessional journalism. There is also a need to explore the editorial motivations of right-
wing and left-wing alternative media sites across different countries, and assess the
influence national media systems have in shaping the tone, style and nature of coverage.
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